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PERMA LIFE EIGHT YEARS AFTER: IS THE
DOCTRINE OF IN PARI DELICTO STILL A
POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENT TO PRIVATE
ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFS?
Dale A. Normington*
The private antitrust action is authorized by section 4 of the
Clayton Act.' The potential in these actions for recovery of treble
damages and attorney's fees not only allows private persons to be
compensated for their injuries but acts as a financial incentive for
such enforcement.' Private enforcement was designed to obviate the
necessity for expanded federal enforcement; 3 governmental (public)
enforcement, which is sometimes selective and concerned with more
flagrant violations, is thus supplemented by the private suit, which
discourages antitrust violations by heightening the possibility that
violators will be exposed and subjected to the deterrent effect of
large damage awards.4 Private antitrust actions are therefore beneficial to society through their impact on those who might otherwise
engage in anti-competitive business conduct. This impact is a necessary complement to public enforcement.
This article will concern itself with the question of whether a
private plaintiff who has participated in the alleged antitrust violation or violations upon which suit has been brought, should be
barred from seeking a remedy for these violations because of such
participation. Specifically, the availability of the defense of in pari
delicto to defendants in private antitrust actions will be discussed
through a review of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.5
which limited the use of in pari delicto, and several United States
* Assistant Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., University of Akron,
1966; J.D., University of Akron, 1969. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Richard C. Berry, University of Dayton School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2. P. AREEDA, ANTrrrusT ANALysis
159 (2d ed. 1974).
3. See Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78
H~Av. L. REv. 1241 (1965); see also Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillarof Antitrust, 3 ANTITusT BuLL. 167, 168 (1958).
4. See P. A.EEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsis
159 (2d ed. 1974).
5. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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Court of Appeals decisions applying the Supreme Court's standard
for the use of this defense. The most recent Court of Appeals decision concerning the availability of the in pari delicto defense in
private antitrust actions, Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,, appears
to be a more restricted reading of Perma Life than that of other
circuits which have reviewed the Perma Life decision.' Javelin limits the use of in paridelicto to a degree which increases the probability of private plaintiffs recovering damages under circumstances
negated by the Perma Life case, in contradiction to the underlying
policy of the antitrust laws. It is here advocated that the Javelin
decision should not become the stfandard by which the use of the in
pari delicto defense in private antitrust actions is determined. In
order to understand why this position is advocated, it is necessary
to briefly review the history of the in pari delicto defense in private
antitrust actions.
in Pari Delicto IN ANTITRUST LAW
The Latin phrase in pari delicto means literally "of equal
fault." In the antitrust field, however, the concept has been utilized
as a complete defense to an action brought by a plaintiff who participated in an alleged antitrust violation, even where the plaintiff's
8
participation was of a lesser degree than the defendant's. Prior to
the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act,' Congress rejected
several bills which would have provided for the defense of in pari
delicto indicating an intention to permit recovery even though a
plaintiff participated in the scheme." Subsequent additions and
amendments to the antitrust laws did not provide for the defense,
but several early decisions" regarded it as applicable to antitrust
actions. Prior to Perma Life many courts continued to recognize in
pari delicto as a defense." The decisions allowing the defense
I.

HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF

6. Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943
(1976); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); South-East Coal
Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970); Premier Electrical Constr. Co.
v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
8. See Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1241, 1242 (1965); 47 TExAs L. REv. 322, 323 (1968); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Blackmore, 277 F. 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1921).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
10. See Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in PrivateAntitrust Suits - The Defense of
In Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. Rav. 785, 787 & n.12 (1955).
11. Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 F. 845 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921).
12. See, e.g., Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1966);
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seemed to base their disinclination to allow recovery to the participating plaintiff on an unwillingness to reward wrongdoers.' 3 In at
least two situations, however, the participation of the plaintiff was
held to foreclose recovery. In the first of these, an exception to the
in pari delicto defense was recognized in a situation where the plaintiff had withdrawn from the illegal scheme and was seeking damages sustained after his participation had ended." More importantly, in the second, an exception was allowed where "coercion" or
disparity in bargaining power forced a plaintiff to enter into the
illegal scheme. 5 The "coercion" exception was applied in situations
where a plaintiff would lose his investment if he did not participate
or would lose his only source of supply by refusing to participate."6
The rationale for the disparity of bargaining power exception centered on the fact that the plaintiff had only participated in the
arrangement "because he had no realistic alternative."'"
The United States Supreme Court had not, prior to 1968, expressly rejected the defense of in pari delicto, but its use was apparently discouraged by the Court's announced policy of stressing the
public nature of private antitrust enforcement and "regarding
plaintiffs as 'private attorneys general' for the enforcement of antitrust legislation."'" In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, " the Supreme Court rejected the defense of "unclean
hands, 12 stating:
If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws,
they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought
against them by the Government or by injured private persons. The
alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the
Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 960 (1954).
13. See 47 TEXAS L. REV. 332, 323 (1968); 21 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810 (3d Cir. 1921).
15. See E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 589 (1974).
16. See 47 TEXAS L. REV. 322, 324 (1968).
17. Id.
18. 21 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1968). See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947) where the Court stated: "It is clear Congress intended to
use private self-interest as a means of enforcement .. "
19. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Kiefer-Stewart was a liquor wholesaler who brought an action
against various distilleries for engaging in price-fixing. The distilleries interposed a defense
alleging that Kiefer-Stewart was engaged in a price-fixing agreement with other wholesalers
setting minimum resale prices.
20. "Unclean hands," although related to in pari delicto, is applicable where the plaintiff violates the law in a manner which is not connected with the alleged illegal activity
engaged in by the defendant. See 16N VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATIONS § 109.02 (1976).
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unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against
liability to those they injured."'
As a result of the Kiefer-Stewart decision, some courts were of the
opinion that in pari delicto was also no longer viable as a defense
to antitrust actions in light of the Supreme Court's avowed interest
22
in buttressing the private antitrust action. In 1959, the Court
brushed aside a defendant's attempt to defend against plaintiff's
breach of contract suit by alleging the contract was in violation of
the antitrust laws,2 3 stating that the defense would not lie unless the
enforcement of the contract would sanction an illegal restraint of
trade. 24 A predilection by the Court against in pari delicto seemed
apparent.
In Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 25 a decision noted for its effect on
resale price maintenance through the device of consignment sales,
the Supreme Court, without specific mention of in pari delicto,
nevertheless seemed to reject its availability as a defense where
economic coercion was present. The public aspect of the private
treble-damage action which had motivated the Court to reject the
26
defenses noted above seemed to be at the heart of the decision. In
coercive2
several instances Justice Douglas termed the agreement
and reasoned that since it was the intention of Congress to prohibit
such agreements, a party coerced into accepting them should not be
denied recovery for having participated.2 The Simpson decision
recognized that economic coercion could include not only the threatened loss of a past 29investment but also the loss of a coveted economic opportunity.
21. 340 U.S. at 214.
22. See, e.g., 16N VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 109.02
(1976); Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) where
the court stated that the vindication of the public interest in free competition was "a
necessity overriding the particular equities which might exist between the immediate
parties." Id. at 598. See also Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 509,
511 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 48 Nw. L. REV. 619 (1953).
23. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1958).
24. Id. at 520-21. See ABA ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 297 (1975).
25. 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Simpson, a dealer for Union Oil who sold consignment gasoline
at prices set by Union, had his lease cancelled for selling below these fixed prices.
26. Id. at 16-17.
27. Id. at 17, 22, 24.
28. See 21 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1083, 1085 & n.21 (1968).
29. See Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HA&v. L. REV. 63, 263
(1968).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/3

19771

PERMA LIFE

II.

Perma Life AND ITS

IMPORT

Four years later, the Court at last dealt directly with the in pari
delicto defense in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts
Corp.33 The plaintiffs in that case brought a treble-damage action
alleging that their franchise agreements with the franchisor, an automotive parts distributor, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 3'
and section 3 of the Clayton Act. 32 The agreements granted exclusive territorial rights to the plaintiffs who in return agreed to resell
the products at prices set by the defendant, buy parts exclusively
from the defendant, and do business only at locations consented to
by the defendant. After several years of earning substantial profits
the plaintiffs sought and were denied the opportunity to open new
outlets, to purchase from alternative sources of supply and to vary
the fixed prices. The franchise agreements were subsequently terminated, and the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the agreements
had been in restraint of trade and had substantially lessened competition. 3 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court granting summary judgment for the defendants, concluding
that plaintiffs' signing of the agreements barred them, through the
defense of in paridelicto, from asssailing the legality of the franchise
agreement under the antitrust laws.34 The plaintiffs' mere participation in the scheme was sufficient to invoke the defense. The Supreme Court reversed, casting grave doubts upon the continued
viability of the in parti delicto defense in private antitrust actions.
Mr. Justice Black wrote the principal opinion in Perma Life. 31
Recognizing that the elimination by courts of the in pari delicto
defense could reward wrongdoers, he nevertheless felt that the
threat of the treble-damage action as a deterrent to antitrust violations could best be served by removing obstacles to its use. He
suggested that "[t]he possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a plaintiff's point of view can of course be taken into
consideration in computing damages. ' ' 31 Furthermore, maintained
Justice Black, the doctrine of in paridelicto itself, "with its complex
scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to
30. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
33. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants had violated the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). 392 U.S. at 135.
34. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967).
35. Justice Black was joined in his opinion by the Chief Justice, and Justices Douglas
and Brennan.
36. 392 U.S. at 140.
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an antitrust action. ' 37 Standing alone, this language would not seem
to permit a compromise between business morality on the one hand
and the interest in competition on the other; 38 however the opinion
was limited both by Justice Black's own further comments and the
concurring opinions. 9 Justice Black first noted that the Court did
not have to decide the question of whether voluntary involvement
in the scheme, which he characterized as having to be monopolistic
in scope, "could ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of in
pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action."" Secondly, he
emphasized that the plaintiffs in Perma Life had not voluntarily
entered into the franchise agreement; rather, they had been subject
to an unequal, coercive bargaining situation."
In their respective concurring opinions, Justices Fortas, Marshall and White argued for an exclusion of the defense where the
plaintiffs did not bear equal responsibility for establishing, promoting or continuing the scheme, or were forced to accept the deal or
forego the opportunity.2 Justice Fortas argued for availability of the
defense where the fault was reasonably equal. 3 Justice Marshall
emphasized that plaintiffs should be permitted a recovery where
duress was present but would not permit a recovery where
"petitioners actually participated in the formulation of the entire
agreement."" Justice White would permit recovery where plaintiffs
were coerced into participation but "would deny recovery where
plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for
injury resulting to one of them."' 5 Justice White also countered the
public interest argument for facilitating private antitrust actions by
observing that where the plaintiff shares equal responsibility for the
illegal scheme, "assuring him illegal profits if the agreement in restraint of trade succeeds, and treble damages if it fails, . . . may
encourage what the Act was designed to prevent." Since a negation
of the in pari delicto defense would allow this very anomaly to occur,
37. Id.
38. See 2 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 771 (1973).
39. Justices White, Fortas, and Marshall wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, concurred in part and dissented in part.
For additional commentary on the Perma Life case, see HANDLER, supra note 38 at 77173; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 261-63; 16N VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 109.02 at 109-14.
40. 392 U.S. at 140.
41. Id. at 139-141.
42. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 262 (1968).
43. 392 U.S. at 147.
44. Id. at 150.
45. Id. at 146.
46. Id.
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Justice White felt that "[i]n this situation, it is doubtful that the
ends of section 4 would be measurably served." 7 Justice Harlan,
joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that the lower court
should reconsider the in pari delicto defense from the viewpoint of
whether equal fault was present.4 8
Taken as a whole, Justice Black's qualifying language" and the
concurring and dissenting opinions reveal a less than absolute repudiation of the defense of in pari delicto. Perma Life can be read
simply as a reiteration or expansion of the Simpson disaffirmance
where coercion was present. 50 It unequivocally struck down the use
of in pari delicto where the plaintiff had merely participated in the
illegal scheme. 5 ' Despite Justice Black's "absolute" negation of the
defense it appeared that, although perhaps not in name, at least in
effect, a plaintiff would be subject to the defense of in pari delicto
where he bore equal responsibility for the formulation or continuation of an illegal scheme which he had entered into on a voluntary
basis. The test appeared to be one of "equal guilt"-a true embodiment of the concept of in pari delicto. One noted commentator
predicted:
In light of the opinion's stress on the fact that many of the challenged
restraints were contrary to the plaintiffs' interests, and the finding
that the dealers had been "forced" to accept these terms as a condition of doing business, it may be that Justice Black would not bar
the defense when confronted with a different set of facts. In other
words, he might not be averse to drawing the various distinctions
advocated by the concurring justices. This language seems to indicate
that even Justice Black may not be convinced by his own absolute
affirmation. If that be so, we would be warranted in treating his broad
statement of the rule as mere dictum and the opinion itself as at least
a partial retreat from an absolutism which serves only to rigidify
antitrust law without providing a just solution to its many perplexities.2
It remained, however, for subsequent decisions in the various
United States courts of appeals and district courts to determine if
the report of the death of in pari delicto in Perma Life had been
greatly exaggerated.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 139-141.
See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 H~Av. L. REv. 63, 263 (1968).
See, e.g., 21 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1083, 1087 (1968).
HANDUR, supra note 38 at 773 (1973).
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Perma Life
A review of the decisions which have dealt with the issue of
allowing the defense of in pari delicto to be used in private antitrust
actions manifests a continued viability for its assertion in certain
fact situations. Although the response of some courts to Justice
Black's opinion may have evidenced a reluctance to employ the
defense by name, one observer has noted that, "While there may be
no pari delicto defense in antitrust cases according to the Supreme
Court there is a defense which looks very much like what many of
us used to call the pari delicto defense." 53
The Seventh Circuit in Premier Electrical Construction Co. v.
Miller-Davis Co.54 was the first of the circuit courts of appeals to
interpret the holding of Perma Life.55 While reversing the lower
court's determination that the plaintiff was barred from maintaining its action against defendants under the doctrine of in pari
delicto,55 the Seventh Circuit did not rule out the use of the defense.
Construing Perma Life as standing for a "more limited rule"57 than
Justice Black's apparent absolute prohibition, the court reasoned
that plaintiffs were only barred where they bore "equal responsibility for creating and establishing an illegal scheme."58 Coercion was
also recognized as a factor which would immunize the plaintiff from
the assertion of in pari delicto. The court therefore recognized the
defense but reversed and remanded in order to allow the district
court to determine the factual question whether there had been
unequal bargaining power between the parties. Soon after the
Premierdecision, the Sixth Circuit in South-East Coal Company v.
5 approved a jury instruction which
Consolidation Coal Company"
permitted the plaintiff to recover damages, even though he had
participated in the alleged conspiracy, if it was found that "the
defendants were more responsible than the plaintiff for the formation of the conspiracy."60 Absent such a finding, the defense of in
III.

IN PARI DELIcTo AFTER

53. Millstein, Current Status of Affirmative Defenses, Including the Passing-On Defense, In Pari Delicto and Statutes of Limitations, 38 ANTITRUST L. J. 111, 115 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Millstein].
54. 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
55. The plaintiff in Premier Electric alleged that defendant had induced it to submit
higher electrical subcontract bids to defendant's competitors in a certain project, and assured
plaintiff that, in return, it would receive the electrical subcontract, and that defendant then
breached this agreement.
56. 292 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
57. 422 F.2d at 1138.
58. Id.
59. 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
60. Id. at 784. The instruction also mentioned the requirement that the plaintiff have
withdrawn from the arrangement.
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pari delicto would bar recovery. The court also commented on the
inapplicability of in pari delicto in the presence of other circumstances presumably those in which coercion was present.'
One year later, the Fourth Circuit also refused to read Perma
Life as an absolute rejection of in pari delicto 1 In Columbia Nitrogen Corporation v. Royster Company 3 the court focused on the
concurring opinions in Perma Life:
these opinions teach that when parties of substantially equal economic strength mutually participate in the formulation and execution of the scheme and bear equal responsibility for the consequent
restraint of trade each is barred from seeking treble damages from the
other.
We think it plain, therefore, that a party, who voluntarily formulates and equally participates in a non-coercive agreement for reciprocal dealing until a declining market makes its purchases
unprofitable, cannot maintain an action under 1 of the Sherman Act
against its trading partner."
Of equal importance to this court was the concern of Justice White
in Perma Life that voluntary participants in illegal restraints of
trade not be allowed to recover damages therefrom. "Equal responsibility" was seen by the Fourth Circuit as the sine qua non of in
pari delicto, in order that a balance be struck between the purposes
of the antitrust laws and the public interest in private enforcement.
In Greene v. General Foods,5 the Fifth Circuit recently suggested that the viability of in pari delicto after Perma Life was
questionable; however, the court did not expressly reject its efficacy.
The defense was deemed inapplicable since the facts before the
court disclosed the existence of "a great disparity between the plaintiff and the defendant," 6 thereby raising the spectre of the sort of
unequal bargaining positions which, under Perma Life, merit a finding that the parties were not "in equal fault." In Kestenbaum v.
Falstaff Brewing Corporation,7 however, the same circuit. in dicta
implied that the maintenance of in pari delicto defense had not been
foreclosed by Perma Life; rather, that defense was limited to situa61.
62.

Id.
See 16N

VON KAwNOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 109.02 at

109-

25 (1976).
63. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). The defendant in a
counterclaim based on plaintiffs alleged non-coercive
defendant had voluntarily agreed.
64. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
65. 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
66. Id. at 647.
J
67. 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
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tions where the plaintiff voluntarily bore equal responsibility for the
illegal scheme."
Two other circuits have also acknowledged support for in pari
delicto as an affirmative defense. The Second Circuit, also in dicta,
stated that "a plaintiff may properly be denied antitrust relief when
his culpability is equal to that of the defendant.""9 The Third Circuit upheld a district court ruling that plaintiff's participation in an
illegal scheme was not of sufficient magnitude to subject the plaintiff to the defense of in pari delic to.7"
Several district court cases have cited PermaLife for the proposition that the doctrine of in pari delicto has been abolished but
have, nonetheless, permitted a defense, "wholly apart from the idea
of in pari delicto, based upon a concept of involvement and participation in the unlawful scheme."'" These cases accord with the previously mentioned circuit court opinions in recognizing the continued viability of the defense of in pari delicto in some form even if
not eo nomine:
The bulk of the cases since Perma Life are disinclined to deny the
theoretical possibility of a defense in extreme circumstances, but are
rigorous in their perusal of any claim that conditions for the theoretically possible defense have been met in a particular instance."
The "extreme circumstances," to which the above commentator alludes as sufficient to invoke in pari delicto to bar the private
antitrust plaintiff from recovery, may arise in the following situations:
1. Where the plaintiff has instigated the illegal scheme.
2. Where the plaintiff has entered into the illegal scheme voluntarily, with equal bargaining power, and bearing equal responsibility for
the formulation and continuation of the scheme.
3. Where the plaintiff voluntarily entered an already existing illegal
scheme and participated on an equal basis in its continued success.
The courts have specifically announced that the first two situations
will result in the application of the defense. 3 Their opinions can, in
68.

Id. at 695 n.4.

69. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added); see also Pearlstein v. Seudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S 1013 (1971).
70. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
71. Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D.
Ore. 1973).
72. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977) § 250 at 784 n.5.
73. See, e.g., Premier Electrical Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., note 54 supra; Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., note 63 supra.
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the view of this author, also be read expansively to include the third
situation. The defense would be applicable where the plaintiff did
not fully participate or did so because of coercive factors or unequal
bargaining power in favor of the defendant. It has also been suggested that a plaintiff, although an equal participant in the allegedly illegal scheme, should not be barred from bringing a cause of
action for damages suffered after it has withdrawn therefrom:
Indeed, if it has plainly withdrawn and started to compete, even a
firm which was the initial instigator of the unlawful arrangement
ought to be granted a cause of action for any damage done to it by
other participants if they take retaliatory action because of the withdrawal. The crucial thing is to assure that notions of fairness inter se
do not reduce unduly the likelihood of competitive conditions being
restored."
Presumably the plaintiff would not be accorded a recovery for any
damages he suffered while still a participant. Permitting a plaintiff
to recover after he has ceased to participate in the scheme could
provide incentive for such withdrawal.75 The argument is made,
however, that sanctioning the defense in cases of "equal fault" is
unsatisfactory as it would allow some antitrust violators to escape
punishment in derogation of the public interest. 6 The deterrent
effect produced by the fear of being sued by one's unsuccessful
partner in an illegal scheme, it is advocated, will serve a greater
public purpose than the harm occasioned by permitting a participant to profit from the violation itself.7"
The law, as an inexact science, often encounters difficulties in
defining when "equality or substantial equality is present." Some
of these difficulties could be avoided by refusing to implement a test
which is ostensibly one of comparative negligence. However, courts
which have wrestled with such other complex legal concepts as conscious parallelism and materiality should be able to cope with an
additional undefined standard.78 Justice Black suggests that a
plaintiff's profits from the illegal scheme could be offset against his
damages. To implement such a policy, however, would render futile
many potential suits because the recovery would be insubstantial.
Equitable considerations dictate that a voluntary participant
74. SULUVAN, supra note 72, at 784.
75. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in PrivateAntitrust Suits, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1965).
76. See, e.g., 47 TExAs L. REv. 322, 326 (1968).
77. Id.
78. See Millstein, supra note 53 at 116.
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should not recover, even in diminished form, for losses suffered as a
result of his acquiesence in an illegal scheme.7" The alternative, as
suggested by Justice Harlan, is to risk "pay[ing] violators three
times their losses in doing what public policy seeks to deter them
from doing. 8 A plaintiff who actively participates on a voluntary
basis in an illegal scheme seems "morally undeserving of compensation." 8 ' Courts can give recognition to the policies of the antitrust
laws by refusing to abolish or strictly limit in pari delicto beyond
the boundaries set in those cases which have interpreted PermaLife
as establishing an "equal responsibility" standard.
Permitting factors such as coercion by the defendant and inequality of bargaining power between the parties to obviate in pari
delicto sufficiently sustains the interest of the public in advancing
the efficacy of the private antitrust action. Further limitations on
its application would be, in this author's opinion, detrimental to
effective antitrust enforcement. The recent Ninth Circuit opinion in
2 however, promulgates
Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal,"
a standard for
application of the in pari delicto defense which seems to be more
restrictive in scope than that embodied in the decisions of the other
circuit courts in their interpretations of Perma Life.
The Javelin case involved a plaintiff who had joined Tire
Brands, Inc., a pre-existing association "founded by a group of tire
distributors for the purpose of pooling their purchasing power.""
The association actually functioned as an anti-competitive scheme
whereby specified exclusive territories were allocated to each member. At the time it joined the association Javelin was fully aware of
the territorial restrictions and "considered the exclusive marketing
area an advantage. 8 4 As Javelin prospered, it developed its own
brands and became less dependent on the Uniroyal brand. Consequently, sales by it of the latter brand declined steadily. In 1972,
Javelin was expelled from the group "for failure to maintain an
acceptable level of quota sales." 5 Javelin "is now one of the largest
tire distributing companies in the United States.""
79. For an excellent and more extensive discussion favoring the retention of in pari
delicto, see Note, In Pari Delictoand Consent as Defenses in PrivateAntitrust Suits, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1241 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAIv. L. REv. 63, 260 (1968).
80. 392 U.S. at 154.
81. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in PrivateAntitrust Suits, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1965).
82. 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 277.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 278.
86. Id.
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In 1973 Javelin brought suit alleging that defendants had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 7 by allocating territories, engaging in tie-in sales and refusing to deal with plaintiff. The district
court granted summary judgment for defendants "based upon Javelin being in pari delicto in the acts alleged."" The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the district court was in error in granting
summary judgment on this ground. 8
On the basis of its examination of the Perma Life decision, the
Javelin court found that an "imprecise standard" had been established whereby some degree of involvement by a plaintiff would bar
an action. A review of the decisions in the other circuits caused the
court to note that "such decisions seem to temper Perma Life's
apparent abolition of the in pari delicto defense." 0 Satisfied that
the defense had continued viability, the court held that the Perma
Life decision mandated that plaintiffs be barred from recovery only
in "rare" circumstances.' This holding is in contrast to that of other
circuits where the defense appears to be available in a wider range
92
of circumstances.
Stressing that courts should encourage private antitrust actions
because of a public interest represented by the plaintiff in tandem
with its own interest in the suit, the court announced that only
"when the illegal conspiracy would not have been formed but for the
9' 3
plaintiff's participation, the plaintiff is barred from recovery.
The Ninth Circuit has, therefore, fashioned a standard dependent on the element of essentiality. The plaintiff in order to be
barred must have been essential to the formation of the illegal
scheme. The use of the "but for" test implies that the court must
find that plaintiff's refusal to participate would have prevented the
genesis of a conspiracy. 4 Those whose involvement was "equal" but
not "essential" to the formation apparently would not be barred. As
the Javelin court said, while the true instigator of the scheme would
clearly be barred, "[w]hether founding members of a conspiracy
87.
88.
89.
90.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
546 F.2d at 278.
Id.
Id. at 279.

91.

Id.

92. See the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 54 through 70 supra.
93. 546 F.2d at 279 (emphasis added).
94. There is some support in the other circuits for limiting in pari delicto to parties who
participated in the formulation stage of the conspiracy. See, e.g., South-East Coal Co. v.
Consolidation Coal, 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970). In this formulation, "equal" participation
appears sufficient to invoke the defense.
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are barred is a question of fact for the jury."95 It is admitted by the
court that this test will place a "high burden of proof" upon the
party raising the in pari delicto defense." Additionally, a party who
joins a pre-existing conspiracy would be immunized from in pari
delicto unless its inclusion was essential to the continuation of the
scheme.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Javelin opinion represents a departure from the previous
interpretations of Perma Life. The balance achieved in other circuits between the public interest and the policies of the antitrust
laws is not reflected in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. The continued
viability of the in pari delicto defense, at least in the Ninth Circuit,
has been jeopardized. Plaintiffs whose participation in the anticompetitive scheme was equal in stature to that of the other participants, but not "essential" to the scheme's success, will be inviolate.
The public benefit is not served to any greater degree by permitting
those who voluntarily participated on an equal basis in an illegal
scheme to recover damages, while those whose involvement was only
infinitesimally, more culpable are precluded from recovery. It is
hoped that, in view of the considerations discussed earlier in this
article, other federal courts will continue to follow a path of moderation sanctioning in pari delicto in more than "rare circumstances."
The weight of opinion relative to the PermaLife decision favors such
treatment.
It has been the objective of this article to present an analysis
of the current status of the affirmative defense of in pari delicto in
private antitrust actions and to argue for its continued viability.
Courts should be flexible in permitting the maintenance of the defense. The Perma Life decision did not abolish the in pari delicto
doctrine and, it is submitted, those circuit courts recognizing its use
in circumstances where voluntary, equal responsibility is present
have correctly set the standard for its future application. The public
interest in penalizing those who would violate the antitrust laws
mandates a cautious application of the defense. Thus, the interaction of this factor with the equities of the parties involved and the
policies of the antitrust laws argues for an allowance of in pari
delicto where equal rather than essential participation by the accuser is present. Allowing a degree of indefiniteness when "equal re95. 546 F.2d at 279.
96.

Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/3

1977]

PERMA LIFE

213

sponsibility" exists is preferable to the outright prohibition of in
pari delicto or a standard which effectively accomplishes such a
prohibition.
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